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FITTING THE FORMULA FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW:




The ill-defined law-fact distinction often stands as the
gatekeeper to judicial review of an agency deportation order,
restricting noncitizens facing deportation to raising only questions of
law when appearing before an appellate court.1 Even when courts
are permitted to review factual questions, they must do so under the
deferential substantial evidence standard of review. 2
People who fear torture at the hands of government officials
in their home country, for example, often cannot seek to reverse an
agency deportation order when the error is one of fact. The
wholesale restriction of the review of facts threatens to hamstring
reviewing courts from delivering justice. It shifts the focus of
appellate briefing to the threshold question of whether the claim
raises an issue of law, a complex question, and away from the merits
of the case. Moreover, appellate courts must accept agency findings
* Assistant Professor of Clinical Education and Director of the Immigration Clinic
at University of Miami School of Law.
' See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006) (ensuring jurisdiction over
"constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review," even
if otherwise barred). For a list of jurisdictional bars, see infra notes 18 and 20.
2 See infra note 16.
3 As discussed infra note 44, appellate courts except the Ninth Circuit have
held that applicants for relief under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture
typically fall within the jurisdictional bar at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2005),
which states that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of
removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed" an
offense listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(2) or 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or
(D) or any offense covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) "for which both
predicate offenses are . . . otherwise covered by" 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art 3, § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 5. TREATY Doe. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85.
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of fact even in the face of widespread criticisms of the quality of
those decisions and the politicized nature of administrative judge
appointments. 4
The restriction on review most affects cases whose
dispositions typically turn on the resolution of factual issues,
including claims under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture
and claims for discretionary relief from deportation like cancellation
of removal. In Convention Against Torture claims, for example,
noncitizens must establish that it is more likely than not that an agent
of their home country will inflict severe pain or suffering on them.
These claims often involve extensive fact-finding on the part of the
immigration judge regarding conditions in the applicant's home
country and the applicant's personal circumstances. At the same
time, these claims raise a plethora of issues that arguably are not
purely factual, including such critical questions as: "Does the feared
mistreatment rise to the level of torture?" "Is the mistreatment likely
to happen?" "Has the judge followed the standards governing factual
adjudications?" Whether or not a federal appellate court can answer
these questions depends on which side of the law-fact divide they
fall. Much is at stake for the noncitizens raising these claims. If
their claims are factual rather than legal, the law precludes federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction, leaving the agency as the final
arbiter of whether or not noncitizens should be deported.
Academics, courts, and litigators have struggled with the law-
fact distinction, a distinction whose murkiness is matched only by its
ubiquity in the law. Some have argued persuasively that there is no
4 Gabriel Pacyniak, Current Development: Judicial Branch: Controversy
Reemerges over Hiring, Review of Immigration Judges, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 805,
806 (2008); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag,
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 352-
53 (2007); Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, Overwhelmed Circuit Courts Lashing Out
at the BIA and Selected Immigration Judges: Is Streamlining to Blame?, 82
INTERPRETER RELEASES 2005, 2005-07 (2005); Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).
s Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 101, 102 (2005); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. at 290 (noting
"[lt]here is substantial authority in the Circuits on both sides of this question [of
how to treat mixed questions of law and fact]."); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.
99, 110-11 (1995) (". . . the proper characterization of a question as one of fact or
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ontological, epistemological, or analytical distinction between fact
and law and that law, as a social construct, is simply a subspecies of
fact.6 Others disagree, arguing that there is an analytical difference
between fact and law but recognizing the many difficulties of
applying it.7 Some have eschewed the notions of law and fact as
binary concepts, characterizing them instead as "points of rest and
relative stability on a continuum of experience. More practically,
many point out that the distinction may be understood as a functional
way of allocating decision-making power, for example between a
judge and jury, or agency and reviewing court.9 Under this view, the
law is sometimes slippery."); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200
(9th Cir. 1984) ("our jurisprudence concerning appellate review of mixed
questions lacks clarity and coherence."); S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States,
433 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1970), rev'd, 406 U.S. 1 (1972) (characterizing the
concept of a mixed question as an "elusive abomination[]"); Khan v. Filip, 554
F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that "the line between legal
questions . . . and factual determinations...is occasionally difficult to draw"); See,
e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction,
97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1769 (2003); see also Richard D. Friedman, Standards of
Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 916
(1992); Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of
Federal Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 238-47
(1991).
6 See, e.g., Allen & Pardo, supra note 5; see also Friedman, supra note 5.
7 Warner, supra note 5, at 103; see also Aaron G. Leiderman, Preserving the
Constitution 's Most Important Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions
Under the REAL ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1367 (2006) (recognizing that
"distinguishing law from fact is certainly no easy task" but nonetheless engaging
with the distinction because it exists in immigration law).
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229,
233-37 (1985). But see Warner, supra note 5, at 108 (arguing that "it is a fallacy
that mixed questions lie in the middle of a continuum with law and fact on either
side" and that "[s]ome questions are simply outside the continuum."). Warner,
however, limits his concept of law to a rule that "appl[ies] for all similarly situated
people," a much more narrow concept of law than is assumed in this article. Id.
9 Friedman, supra note 5, at 925; see also Leiderman, supra note 7; Tsen Lee,
supra note 5, at 236; Warner, supra note 5, at 105-06. See also Monaghan, supra
note 8, at 237 ("[a]t least in those instances in which Congress has not spoken and
in which the issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple
historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that,
as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better
positioned than another to decide the issue in question."). The U.S. Supreme Court
has also expressed this view. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985)
592010]
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answer to whether a question is one of fact or law is the same as the
answer to which decision-maker is best suited to make a particular
finding or whether an issue is best reviewed under a particular
standard of review.
This article does not directly engage with these important
issues. I instead proceed from two, uncontroversial assumptions.
First, I assume that the law-fact distinction does exist as a concept in
the law, regardless of its ontological or epistemological status. We
therefore must reckon with it. This article therefore takes the law-
fact distinction as a given in immigration law, engaging with how it
has played out in the world of immigration law litigation.' 0 Second,
I assume that federal appellate courts are unlikely to rule on the
meaning of the law-fact distinction in immigration jurisdictional
statutes on the basis of a policy decision about what decision maker
is best suited for the job, making it necessary for courts and litigators
to theorize about the law-fact distinction as a concept.
This article demonstrates that the basic, analytical concept of
a question of law in immigration court decisions is more expansive
than is typically understood. I unearth and analyze confusion in
immigration case law and propose some ways for us to think more
clearly about the law-fact distinction, focusing on questions that
involve the application of law to facts that have already been
established - questions that are commonly called mixed questions."
("[p]erhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from the practical truth that
the decision to label an issue a 'question of law,' a 'question of fact,' or a 'mixed
question of law and fact' is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of
analysis.").
10 In taking the law-fact distinction as a given, this article does not address the
critically important questions of whether the statutory limitations on judicial
review violate the Suspension Clause, Article III, or constitutional due process.
1 See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (defining
mixed question as one in which "the historical facts are admitted or established, the
rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory
standard."). See also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)
(characterizing as a mixed question the question of whether "historical facts ...
amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause"); Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 112-13 (1995) ("application of the controlling legal standard to the
historical facts . . . presents a 'mixed question of law and fact.'"). Some have
pointed out that the label "mixed question" is unhelpful because the term has been
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Part II of this article briefly traces the history of immigration judicial
review, culminating with the REAL ID Act of 2005 and the
jurisdictional savings clause contained in it. Part III discusses the
concept of a mixed question of law and fact, offering a basic formula
that captures the concept of a mixed question as a question of law.
In Part IV, I discuss the extent to which courts regard particular
mixed questions as legal or factual. Part V suggests a meta-rule
formula for mixed questions that offers a way to identify and
categorize mixed questions involving a breach of the rules of
decision-making. Part VI addresses the interplay between the
concepts of law-fact and discretion, as this has been a focal point of
confusion. The article concludes with thoughts about how courts and
litigators should proceed in their thinking about the law-fact
distinction.
II. Brief History ofImmigration Judicial Review
The history of judicial review over immigration began with
our nation's first restrictions on immigration in the late l9th century
aimed at people with criminal convictions, prostitutes, people likely
to become public charges, and Asian immigrants. 12  Noncitizens
could seek federal court review over deportation and exclusion
orders by way of petitions for writs of habeas corpus.1 3 Available to
challenge the lawfulness of executive detention, habeas corpus
provided the sole means for noncitizens to challenge decisions by
defined in multiple ways. E.g., Warner, supra note 5, 102.
12 See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, §5, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (1875). In 1882,
Congress enacted legislation excluding noncitizens expected to become public
charges as well as "lunatics," and "idiots." See Immigrant Fund Act, ch. 376, §2,
22 Stat. 214, 214 (1882). In the same year, Congress passed the first Chinese
exclusion act. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58-59 (to execute
certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese).
13 See, e.g., In re Jung Ah Lung, 25 F. 141 (D. Cal. 1885), affd, United States
v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 635 (1888). See also Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S.
229, 234-35 ("During [the years after 1891], the cases continued to recognize that
Congress had intended to make these administrative decisions nonreviewable to
the fullest extent possible under the Constitution.") (citing Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.
149 U.S. 698 (1893). See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive
Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998) (detailing a
discussion of the history of federal court review over immigration decisions).
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immigration officials until the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) of 1952 made the judicial review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 apply to immigration cases.14
In 1961, Congress amended the INA to include a judicial review
provision that made deportation orders reviewable by petition for
review in the courts of appeals and exclusion orders reviewable by
habeas petition in the district courts. 15 The scope of review in both
fora depended on whether the question was legal or factual, making
the former subject to de novo review and the latter subject to
substantial evidence review. 16
Congress transformed the judicial review scheme in 1996 as
part of a wholesale revamping of immigration law that restricted
14 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1955) (holding that the
review provisions of the APA governed despite any suggestion in the INA of 1952
that administrative immigration decisions could not be reviewed by the federal
courts).
15 Prior to amendments in the law in 1996, there were two types of
immigration court proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1996) (proceedings based on
exclusion); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1996) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1996) (proceedings
based on deportability). Individuals charged with a ground of exclusion under
former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1996) were placed in exclusion proceedings under
former 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1996). Individuals charged with a ground of deportation
under former 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1996) were put into deportation proceedings
under former 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1996) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1996). In 1996, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
(1997) (IIRIRA) eliminated the dual track of proceedings and created unified
removal proceedings. The term exclusion was replaced by inadmissibility but the
grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportation remain as distinct grounds
of removal within the INA. Compare INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006),
with INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006).
16 Under the substantial evidence standard in the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006), reviewing courts may disagree with factual
findings only if they are "unsupported by substantial evidence" in the record;
Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 377 (1998)
(interpreting this to require that no reasonable fact-finder would have made the
finding); Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding legal
questions are typically subject to de novo review but courts give deference to
agency interpretations of statutes involving "interpretations of ambiguous statutory
provisions intended by Congress to be left to the agency's discretion") (citing
Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)); Chevron v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding in these cases, courts must
affirm an agency's construction of a statute as long as it is permissible).
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legal options for immigrants. First, the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) repealed judicial review for noncitizens
determined to be deportable under most criminal grounds of
removal.17  Shortly thereafter, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) expanded the bar on review
of criminal orders of removal and added additional jurisdictional
bars, including bars on the review of certain types of discretionary
agency determinations.18 IIRIRA also amended the asylum statute to
require that applicants file for asylum within one year of arriving in
the United States unless they fall into certain exceptions.19 Congress
specified that no court has jurisdiction to review an agency
determination that an applicant had failed to meet the one-year
deadline. 20
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court reined in Congress's
apparent wide-sweeping repeal of judicial review, holding in the
1 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276 (1996). Section 440(a) of AEDPA stated that
orders of deportation based on certain criminal grounds of deportation "shall not be
subject to review by any court." The specific grounds were 8 U.S.C. §§
1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1991) (aggravated felony), 1251(a)(2)(D) (miscellaneous
offenses), or 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (crimes of moral turpitude). Id.
18 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 (1996), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005). "[N]o court shall have
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable
by reason of having committed" an offense listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) or 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) or any offense covered by 8.U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) "for which both predicate offenses are ... otherwise covered by"
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2005). Regarding
discretionary decisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) barred review of "any
judgment regarding the granting of relief under" 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), 1182(i),
1229b, 1229c, or 1255 or "any other decision or action" when "the authority for
which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney
General other than the granting of [asylum]." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)
(2005). The JIRIRA contained additional bars. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i)-
(iv) (2005). The Supreme Court recently held that the jurisdictional bar on certain
discretionary decisions does not extend to review of motions to reopen, which are
discretionary but not specified to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.
Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 838 (2010).
1 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006).
20 8 U.S.C. § 1 158(a)(3) (2006) ("[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review
any determination of the Attorney General . . . regarding the one-year deadline or
its exceptions.").
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seminal case INS v. St. Cyr that noncitizens affected by the
jurisdictional bars could still file petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 21 The court interpreted the jurisdictional
bars as applying only to direct review in the U.S. courts of appeals,
thereby avoiding the constitutional question of whether Congress
would violate the Suspension Clause if it eliminated entirely both
direct and habeas review. 22 In so holding, the Court found that the
statutory interpretation question presented in the merits of the case
fell squarely within the traditional scope of habeas review.2 3
According to the Court, the traditional scope of habeas review has
"encompassed detentions based on errors of law, including the
erroneous application or interpretation of statutes." 24
Congress responded in the REAL ID Act of 2005 by
expressly repealing habeas corpus review for removal orders based
on the enumerated criminal offenses or the exercise of discretion. 2 5
Mindful of the Supreme Court's discussion of the possible
Suspension Clause problem in St. Cyr, Congress enacted what it
characterized as a constitutionally adequate substitute mechanism for
21 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001). See also Kucana v. Holder, 130
S. Ct. 827 (2010) (Supreme Court reaffirming its view that there is a presumption
in favor of judicial review and that Congress must legislate expressly to overcome
this presumption by motions to reopen are reviewable despite jurisdictional bar on
review of certain discretionary determinations).
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety
may require it.").
23 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (deciding the issue was whether
Congress in IRIRA had retroactively eliminated a discretionary form of relief
under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a
discretionary form of relief from deportation).
24 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added); see also Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266 (2008) ("[habeas corpus] entitles the prisoner to a
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to 'the
erroneous application or interpretation' of relevant law" (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
at 302)) (emphasis in original); see generally Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy
of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 139-
41 (2006) (discussing how the REAL ID savings clause should be interpreted to
include the application of law to facts to avoid constitutional concerns).
2REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B), (C) (Suppl. V 2006).
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direct review in the courts of appeals. 26  The REAL ID Act thus
amended the INA to insert a savings clause permitting most
noncitizens with otherwise barred claims to obtain direct appellate
court review of "constitutional claims or questions of law."27
Congress intended the scope of review in the savings clause to match
traditional habeas review, thereby satisfying any constitutional
concern.28 The savings clause in the REAL ID Act therefore
expressly employs the concept of a question of law, restoring review
over questions otherwise barred from judicial review but only in so
far as the questions are legal rather than factual.
The REAL ID judicial review rules, as amended by the
REAL ID Act, remain in force today. Before reviewing an
immigration claim, an appellate court must therefore answer the
critical threshold questions: 1) does a jurisdictional bar apply? and 2)
if so, is the claim nonetheless reviewable under the REAL ID savings
clause as a constitutional question or question of law? If a
jurisdictional bar applies, a court can nonetheless review a claim
under the REAL ID savings clause if it raises a question of law or
constitutional question. This article takes as its focus the concept of
"questions of law" as embodied in the REAL ID savings clause.
26 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 123 (2005) (recognizing that the Supreme
Court's decision in St. Cyr forbids the elimination of all review). The Supreme
Court in St. Cyr recognized that the Suspension Clause problem could be cured by
allowing for a substitute that was "neither inadequate nor ineffective." St. Cyr, 533
U.S. at 314 n.38. See also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315,
326-27 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that questions of law include "the same types of
issues that courts traditionally exercised in habeas review."); Kamara v. Att'y
Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that the REAL ID savings
clause scope of review "mirrors" the traditional scope of habeas).
27 INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006) ("Nothing. . . which
limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of
constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review.. . .. ")
(emphasis added). The savings clause does not include claims barred by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2) (2006).
28 H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 125 (2005) (the "purpose of [the REAL ID
savings clause] is to permit judicial review over those issues that were historically
reviewable on habeas."). As noted previously, the issue of whether the REAL ID
savings clause has provided a constitutionally adequate alternative to habeas
review is critical but beyond the scope of this article.
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III. The Basic Formula of a Mixed Question
The REAL ID savings clause has planted the law-fact
distinction front and center in immigration law jurisprudence. If a
question is subject to a jurisdictional bar, it is only saved under the
savings clause if it is a question of law. Questions of fact remain
outside the savings clause. While the law-fact distinction has often
governed the choice of a standard of review, it now stands as the sole
gatekeeper to review over any question deemed to fall within a
jurisdictional bar.
The savings clause presupposes a simple image-one that
clearly delineates fact from law. The image is of two separate and
discretely bounded sets of questions: one set includes constitutional
questions and questions of law and another set contains questions of
fact. As discussed below, however, this image of non-overlapping,
insular categories of questions is far too simple and, among other
things, ignores the existence of so-called mixed questions of law and
fact.
A mixed question is commonly defined as involving the
application of law to facts that have already been established either
because they have been adjudicated or because they are not in
dispute.29 A mixed question is so termed because it involves both
law and fact. Mixed questions contrast with legal questions that
involve only statutory or constitutional interpretation. Mixed
questions also contrast with factual questions involving the "who,
what, when, and how" of historical events. 3 0
A single case might easily involve all three types of
questions, namely statutory, mixed, and factual. For example, an
asylum case might raise the statutory legal question of how to
interpret the term "persecution" in the refugee definition. 3 1 A factual
question in the same case might be whether government agents from
29 See supra note 11.
30 The Supreme Court has described these types of facts as "basic," "primary,"
or "historical." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963), overruled on
other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). See also Goodman
v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 (1987) (using the term "historical fact").
*8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (2006) (using term "persecution" in the refugee
definition).
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the applicant's home country beat the applicant and threatened to
kidnap her child. A mixed question would be whether the specific
mistreatment suffered by the applicant meets the legal definition of
persecution.
Mixed questions of law and fact may be understood
abstractly as fitting a simple formula. If X denotes the legal rule at
issue and A and B are the established facts, the basic mixed question
formula is:
Do establishedfacts A-B satisfy rule X?
In the asylum example above, the established facts (A and B)
are that government agents beat the applicant and threatened to
kidnap her child. The rule (X) is the legal definition of persecution.
Plugged into the general formula, the mixed question is: Does the
beating and threatened kidnapping satisfy the definition of
persecution? The question involves the application of law (the
definition of persecution) to facts (the mistreatment).
The obvious next question is whether mixed questions like
this one fall on the law or fact side of the law-fact divide. At the
very highest level of abstraction, some courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, have stated that the application of law to fact is a
question of law. As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v.
St. Cyr has stated that "errors of law" traditionally considered in
habeas proceedings included review of "the erroneous application or
interpretation of statutes." 32 The court, however, has not yet ruled on
whether the application of law to fact constitutes a legal question
within the meaning of the REAL ID savings clause.3 3 The Second,
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have taken up the issue, all
finding that such questions are questions of law.34 The Sixth,
32 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001) (emphasis added). The U.S.
Supreme Court cited with approval this part of the decision in Boumediene v. Bush.
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266 (2008).
33 The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a case that would resolve
this circuit split. See Khan v. Holder, No. 09-229, 2010 WL 58387, at *1 (U.S.
Jan. 1 1, 20 10).
34 Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding jurisdiction to
consider "questions of law" including "application of law to undisputed fact");
Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc denied,
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Seventh, and Tenth Circuits disagree, finding that the REAL ID
savings clause only applies to "pure" legal claims or claims
involving "statutory construction." Under the approach of these
courts, the only questions reviewable as questions of law are those
involving the interpretation or constitutionality of a statute. The
application of a statutory definition to the particular facts of a case
would be considered a factual question.
Even more controversy and confusion abound when courts
analyze mixed questions in actual cases. We can best understand this
phenomenon by examining the variety of ways in which courts have
handled questions that fit the basic formula of a mixed question. In
many of these cases, the questions at issue straightforwardly fit the
basic mixed question formula and thus we would expect them to be
treated as legal questions. But even courts that accept mixed
questions as legal nonetheless characterize the claim as an
unreviewable factual question. Alternatively, courts characterize the
question as a reviewable legal claim but then, without explanation,
employ the substantial evidence standard of review for factual
questions.
Ramadan v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 973, 973 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding reviewable mixed
questions of law and fact in which "the historical facts are admitted or established,
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory
standard") (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982));
Jean-Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1321 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007) (application of
law to fact is a legal question within the ambit of review); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.
Dep't. of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 331 (2d Cir. 2006) (". . . the term 'questions of
law' undeniably can encompass claims of 'erroneous application or interpretation
of statutes"') (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302)).
35 Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2006). See also
Stepanovic v. Filip, 554 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding "'questions of
law'" to permit judicial review of only 'pure' questions of law") (citing Viracacha
v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2008)); Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d
1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding questions of law to be a narrow category
involving "issues regarding statutory construction" and rejecting claim that failure
to follow case law is a legal claim). These courts, however, fail to address the
Supreme Court's statement in St. Cyr that errors of law have traditionally included
the application of law to established facts. St Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302.
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IV Disparate Treatment of Particular Mixed Questions
Depending on the precise issue, courts may or may not agree
on the law/fact status of a mixed question. For example, courts
overwhelmingly treat mixed questions as legal questions subject to
de novo review if they involve the question of whether a particular
type of criminal conviction falls within a given ground of
deportation. Rewritten to conform to the basic formula, the mixed
question is:
Does the criminal conviction satisfy the ground of removal?
Courts of appeals universally characterize this question as a
question of law, involving the application of law (the removal
ground) to an established fact (the criminal conviction as evidenced
by the criminal documents).36 In an apparent contradiction, the three
circuits to hold that the REAL ID savings clause excludes mixed
questions have characterized as legal the question of whether a
particular criminal conviction triggers removal under the statute.37
Another example of a mixed question being treated as a
question of law is whether certain types of mistreatment (the
established facts) rise to the level of "torture" within the meaning of
Article 3 in the Convention Against Torture (the rule).38 Using the
basic formula, the question is:
36 E.g., Shaya v. Holder, 586 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2009); Kerr v. Holder, No.
08-60020, 2009 WL 3753528, at *2 (5th Cir. 2009); Lagunas-Salgado v. Holder,
584 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2009); Ramirez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 47, 48 (1st Cir.
2008); Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2007); Blake v.
Gonzales, 481 F.3d 152, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2007); Morales-Alegria v. Gonzales, 449
F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006); Vargas v. Dep't Homeland Sec., 451 F.3d 1105,
1107 (10th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2006);
Garcia v. Att'y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2006); Remoi v. Att'y Gen.,
175 Fed. Appx. 580, 583 (3d Cir. 2006); Guenther v. Gonzales, 127 Fed. Appx.
786, 790 (6th Cir. 2005); Balogun v. Att'y Gen., 425 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (11th
Cir. 2005); Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 324 (4th Cir. 2001).
37 See Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2007);
Vargas v. Dep't Homeland Sec., 451 F.3d 1105, 1107 (10th Cir. 2006); Guenther
v. Gonzales, 127 Fed. Appx. 786, 790 (6th Cir. 2005).
38 COnVention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art 3, § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 5. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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Does the mistreatment satisfy the definition of torture?
The two appellate courts to rule on this precise question have
characterized it as a reviewable question of law. 39  The Eleventh
Circuit has explained: "Whether a particular fact pattern amounts to
'torture' requires a court to apply a legal definition to a set of
undisputed or adjudicated historical facts." The court found that this
"mixed question of law and fact" falls "squarely and
unambiguously" within the REAL ID's savings clause.4 0
This agreement disappears, however, when we look beyond
cases addressing removability for a criminal conviction and the
definition of torture. Courts disagree about the law-fact status of
applied legal standards involving the likelihood of something
happening. For example, the legal standard for a grant of deferral of
removal under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture is that the
person must face a "substantial" likelihood of being tortured. 41 The
question then becomes whether the likelihood of torture is
reviewable as a legal question because it is a mixed question of law.
The question fits the basic formula of a mixed question:
Do the established facts satisfy the rule that the applicant is
substantially likely to be tortured?
Courts disagree about whether this is a question of law. The
Third Circuit has held that the likelihood of torture is a reviewable
legal question, characterizing the question as involving "not disputed
facts but whether the facts, even when accepted as true, sufficiently
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she will be subject to
persecution or torture upon removal [to Haiti]."4 2  The Second
39 Gourdet v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2009); Jean-Pierre v. Att'y Gen.,
500 F.3d 1315, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2007).
40 Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1322 (citing Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1192
(11th Cir. 2004)).
41 See supra note 38; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2000) (applicant
entitled to protection if is "more likely than not to be tortured in the country of
removal.").
42 TOUSsaint v. Att'y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 2006). The court,
however, used the standard for factual question--the substantial evidence test. See
Id. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the apparent
inconsistency between finding a question legal and then using the standard of
review for factual questions.
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Circuit has agreed.43 Other courts, however, have held the likelihood
of torture to be an unreviewable factual question. 44 For these courts,
the probability of an applicant being tortured in the future is purely
factual, involving no legal rule. In so holding, however, these courts
do not explain how the substantial likelihood of torture standard fails
to qualify as a legal rule. As demonstrated above, the application of
the likelihood standard to the established facts of a case conforms to
the basic formula of a mixed question and therefore could be treated
as a question of law.
There is also a circuit split in cases involving the exceptions
to the one-year filing deadline for asylum claims. As discussed in
Part II, asylum applicants must establish "by clear and convincing
evidence" that they have filed for asylum within one year of arriving
in the United States.4 5 A statutory exception exists for applicants
who can demonstrate material "changed" or "extraordinary"
circumstances.46 Because the statute prohibits review of one-year
43 Fernandez v. Holder, No. 08-6205-ag., 2009 WL 3497757, at *1 (2d Cir.
2009) (treating as reviewable claim the issue of whether it was likely that the
applicant would be subject to torture based on undisputed facts).
"4Gourdet v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the likelihood
of torture is an unreviewable factual question); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642,
647 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review how the agency
"considered, interpreted, and weighed the evidence presented" to determine
whether there was a likelihood of torture); Hanan v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 834, 836-
37 (8th Cir. 2006) (characterizing as "factual" the applicant's claim that the agency
incorrectly concluded that he is unlikely to be tortured); Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d
1173, 1192 (11th Cir. 2004) (categorizing the determination of the likelihood of
torture as "administrative fact findings"); Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 998 (8th
Cir. 2009) (finding that a challenge of the BIA's ruling on the likelihood of torture
is "nothing more than a challenge to the agency's factual determinations"); Singh
v. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting the categorization of
the determination of the likelihood of torture as "administrative fact findings").
The Ninth Circuit, however, has a different rule. It has held that factual questions
in CAT cases can be reviewed because it narrowly interprets the bar at 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C) as only divesting jurisdiction over "orders of removal that are
actually based on a petitioner's prior aggravated felony conviction." Bromfield v.
Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).
45- 8 U.S.C. §l 158(a)(2)(B) (2006).
46 8 U.S.C. § 1 158(a)(2)(D) (2006) (requiring applicants to "demonstrat[e] to
the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed
circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility or extraordinary
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deadline determinations, 47 courts have had to determine whether the
REAL ID savings clause applies to permit review of the agency's
application of the "changed" and "extraordinary" circumstances
standards to established facts. Using the basic formula for a mixed
question, the question can be rephrased as:
Do the established facts satisfr either the "changed" or
"extraordinary " circumstances exceptions to the one-year asylum
deadline?
Although the question conforms to the mixed question
formula, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to have ruled that the
application of one-year deadline exceptions is reviewable as a
question of law.4 8  The Second Circuit has taken an intermediate,
case-by-case approach.4 9  All other circuits have ruled that the
circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application" within the one-year
deadline).
47 8 U.S.C. § 1 158(a)(3) (2006) ("[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review
any determination of the Attorney General. . . regarding the one-year deadline or
its exceptions.").
48 Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2007). Initially, the
Ninth Circuit had held that it lacked jurisdiction over the question, finding that the
question was "predominantly factual" and therefore outside the REAL ID savings
clause. The court subsequently withdrew this decision and issued a new one
reversing its jurisdictional holding. See Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218,
1221-22 (9th Cir. 2005), opinion vacated and reissued, 479 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir.
2007). The Ninth Circuit has begun to apply the exceptions to the one-year
deadlines in actual cases. See Toj-Culpatan v. Holder, No. 05-72179, 2009 WL
4256449, at *2 (9th Cir. 2009) (the court cataloged the undisputed facts and then
applied the relevant standard, as illuminated by case law). The court has refused to
review the agency's one-year deadline decision when facts have been in dispute.
See Sillah v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 1042, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). But
see Seesay v. Holder, No. 07-75035, 2009 WL 3287619, at *1 (9th Cir. 2009)
(dissent points out that entry date was disputed and that therefore there should have
been no jurisdiction).
49 In Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329-30 (2d Cir.
2006), the court recognized that the term "questions of law" within the meaning of
the REAL ID savings clause includes claims that raise issues involving the
application of law to fact, including in the asylum one-year deadline context. The
court stated that "[t]he mere use of the term 'erroneous application' of a statute
will not, however, convert a quarrel over an exercise of discretion into a question
of law." Id. at 331. The court's approach is to "look to the nature of the argument
being advanced in the petition" to see if the petitionef s challenge is "merely an
objection to the IJ's factual findings and the balancing of factors in which
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application of the one-year deadline exceptions to established facts
falls outside the REAL ID savings clause as an unreviewable
question of fact.50
The Ninth Circuit's approach finds support in the basic
formula of a mixed question. As discussed above, the question of
whether established facts qualify as either "changed" or
"extraordinary" circumstances fits the basic formula of the
application of law to fact. One caveat regarding the court's analysis,
however, is that the court indicated the result would have been
different if it had ruled that the one-year deadline determination was
discretionary. As discussed in Part V, courts often equate
discretionary determinations with factual ones, even though they are
analytically distinct.
Adding to the confusion surrounding the treatment of mixed
questions, the Ninth Circuit categorized the one-year deadline
question as a reviewable legal question but then have proceeded in a
seemingly contradictory fashion to apply the substantial evidence
test, the standard for factual questions.5 1  After finding that
discretion was exercised." Id. at 332.
50 Hana v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007); Sukwanputra v.
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 635 (3d Cir. 2006); Gomis v. Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 355
(4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, No. 09-194, 2010 WL 58386, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 11,
2010); Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2007); Zhu v. Gonzales,
493 F.3d 588, 595-96 (5th Cir. 2007); Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748
(6th Cir. 2006); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2005); Ignatova v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 2005); Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117,
1130 (10th Cir. 2006); Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 957 (11th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a case
that would resolve this circuit split. Khan v. Holder, No. 09-229, 2010 WL 58387,
at *1 (U.S. Jan.11, 2010). As is discussed in detail in Part V, courts have
nonetheless ruled on legal issues raised in the context of the one-year deadline.
E.g., Shi Jie Ge v. Holder, 588 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (court found reviewable
legal claim in one year deadline case, agency misapplied the "changed
circumstances exception" to the filing deadline, misapplied the plain terms of the
regulation, focused exclusively on the date of his enrollment as a member of the
CDP and ignored regulation which defines changed circumstances far more
broadly).
si See supra note 16 for an explanation of these standards. See also Dhital v.
Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (employing "substantial evidence"
standard to find that established facts had not met the "extraordinary
circumstances" standard for forgiving late-filed asylum application); Husyev v.
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application of the "changed circumstances" standard was a
reviewable legal question, the court without explanation used the
standard for factual questions to hold that "the record does not
compel the conclusion that [the petitioner] has shown 'changed
circumstances."' 52 Other courts have also pigeonholed a question as
legal but then reviewed it under the substantial evidence test.53
In sum, courts vary widely in their treatment of specific
mixed questions in immigration law. Often the law-fact distinction
is under-theorized. Courts that have supplied the most explanation
have acted inconsistently with their conclusions by applying the
standard of review for facts to questions they have determined to be
legal.
V The Meta-Rule Formula For Mixed Questions
The discussion above addresses the basic formula for a mixed
question: Do established facts A-B satisfy rule X? This section
analyzes a particular type of mixed question, namely claims in which
the litigant alleges that the agency has breached the rules governing
fair decision-making-what I will call meta-rules. The key idea is
that, in making a particular determination, an adjudicator must
follow a certain rule governing decision-making. A reviewing court
looks at the administrative record and decision (the established facts
A-B) to determine whether the adjudicator followed the rule of
decision-making (rule X).
For example, a court reviewing a case under the Convention
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding the same with respect
to the "extraordinary circumstances" exception).
52 Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 657.
53 E.g., Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding reviewable
under the REAL ID savings clause as a legal question the issue of whether a group
to which an applicant belonged was a "terrorist organization" within the meaning
of the bar to asylum eligibility but employing the substantial evidence test). The
U.S. Supreme Court has noted this confusion concerning the standard of review for
questions involving the application of law to established facts. See Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 n.19 (1982). The issue of whether the
substantial evidence test should be used as the standard of review for mixed
questions deemed legal rather than factual is important but beyond the scope of
this article.
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Against Torture might ask whether the immigration judge considered
all relevant evidence when determining that the applicant was not
previously harmed by government officials in his home country. In a
case involving discretionary relief from deportation, a reviewing
court could ask whether the immigration judge employed the correct
legal standard. The meta-rule formula for a mixed question can be
stated in general form as:
Based on the established facts A-B in the administrative record
and decision, did the judge violate rule X regarding how
determinations should be made?
Courts routinely review meta-rule violations as questions of
law, although they typically do not identify these questions as
involving the application of a rule (the rule of decision making) to
established facts (the administrative record and decision)i 4
Examples of meta-rules are that adjudicators must consider
relevant evidence in the record;55 consider and rule on all claims
54 For example, the Seventh Circuit has provided the following explanation of
what it considers to be a legal challenge involving a breach of the rules of
decision-making:
[A]ll the court can decide is whether the Board committed an error of law.
That will usually be a misinterpretation of a statute, regulation, or
constitutional provision. But it could also be a misreading of the Board's
own precedent, or the Board's use of the wrong legal standard, or simply a
failure to exercise discretion or to consider factors acknowledged to be
material to such an exercise.
Huang v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
55Shatku v. Holder, 331 Fed. Appx. 29, 30 (2d Cir. 2009) (despite
jurisdictional bar over questions concerning timeliness of asylum application, court
had jurisdiction over whether "it was legal error for the agency to fail to consider
all evidence of probative value") (citing Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140,
149 (2d Cir. 2003)), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc); Hanan v. Mukasey,
519 F.3d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Because an allegation of wholesale failure to
consider evidence implicates due process, we have jurisdiction to review this
constitutional question") (citing Tun v. Gonzalez, 485 F.3d 1014, 1025 (8th Cir.
2007)).
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raised;56 state the reasons for their decisions so that appellate courts
can engage in meaningful review;57 make logical decisions;58 apply
the correct legal standard to the facts; 59 not rely on facts clearly
56 E.g., Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2001) (an U "must
actually consider the evidence and argument that a party presents") (citing Rhoa-
Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26, 34 (7th Cir. 1992)); Toussaint v. Att'y Gen., 455 F.3d
409, 417 (3d Cir. 2006) (must consider separate claims raised).
5 E.g., Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[i]n order for
us to be able to give meaningful review to [a BIA] decision, we must have some
insight into its reasoning."); Dakaj v. Holder, 580 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2009) (agency
must articulate a reason, even in discretionary determinations); Jean-Pierre v. Att'y
Gen., 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Lavira v. Att'y Gen., 478 F.3d 158,
164 (3d Cir. 2007) ("holding, in a case involving an HIV-positive criminal alien
who claimed that he would be singled out for torture if returned to Haiti, that a
'decision that flatly ignores the grounds presented by the petitioner fails to furnish
the Court of Appeals with the basis for its particular decision, and as such any
meaningful review is not possible"'); see also, e.g., Tan v. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d
1369, 1375-77 (11th Cir. 2006) (granting a petition for review of an application for
withholding of removal when the absence of a reasoned decision and adequate
factual findings left the court unable to review the claim); Mezvrishvili v. Att'y
Gen., 467 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (same result in an asylum
case); Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (remanding a CAT
determination to the BIA because it was "insufficiently reasoned as a matter of
law"); Antipova v. Att'y Gen., 392 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (remanding a
petition for asylum to the BIA because the court could not "undertak[e] meaningful
judicial review of the merits.").
58 E.g., Larngar v. Holder, 562 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2009) (motion to reopen case
remanded to agency where flaw in logic constituted legal error regarding whether
the applicant was claiming a changed in country conditions or a change in personal
circumstances).
59 E.g., Tariq v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 2007) (jurisdiction to
consider whether agency correctly required "exceptional circumstances" standard
instead of "extraordinary circumstances" standard); Orellana-Gutierrez v.
Mukasey, 272 F. App'x 59 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewable question of law whether the
agency failed to consider certain relatives qualifying relatives for the purpose of
discretionary relief); Veloso v. Mukasey, 258 F. App'x 967 (9th Cir. 2007)
(jurisdiction to review as a question of law whether the BIA committed legal error
by requiring corroborating evidence of his medical condition); Mireles v.
Gonzales, 433 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006) (legal error in understanding of
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard); Shi Jie Ge v. Holder, 588
F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (legal error where agency failed to "properly appj[ly]l"
precedent regarding what counts as sufficient evidence in an asylum case);
Ignatova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding jurisdiction to
consider the legal standard for a good faith marriage and to determine whether the
credited evidence meets that standard). But see Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274,
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contradicted by the record; 60 rely only on facts in the record;6 1 defer
to the fact-finding of immigration judges;62 be a neutral
decisionmaker;63 not engage in additional fact-finding when case is
on appeal; 64  state rational justifications for decisions; 65  not
mischaracterize evidence; 66  and provide a fundamentally fair
67 lit8hearing. This list is not exhaustive.68  Courts have also found
1282 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding questions of law to be a narrow category involving
"issues regarding statutory construction" and rejecting claim that failure to follow
case law is a legal claim).
60 E.g, Liu v. INS, 508 F.3d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 2007) (review over
discretionary determination where legal error of "unambiguous
mischaracterizations" of the record); Sillah v. Holder, 333 Fed. Appx. 209, 211
(9th Cir. 2009) (finding REAL ID savings clause includes "legal question of
whether the IJ properly applied the evidentiary standard" and correct evidentiary
standard not applied because factual finding was clearly contradicted by the
record).
61 E.g., Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007) (judge
impermissibly relied on personal opinion that the applicant "did not dress or speak
like or exhibit the mannerisms of a homosexual. . .")
62 E.g., Guzman v. Holder, 568 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversible legal error
when BIA fails to defer to IJ fact finding).
63 E.g., Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2008) (judge failed to be
neutral adjudicator when concluded that no one would identify the applicant as a
gay man unless he had a male partner).
64 E.g., Brezilien v. Holder, 565 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversible legal
error when BIA engages in additional fact-finding in violation of 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1 (d)(3)(i) (2007)).
65 Camara v. Dep't Homeland Sec, 497 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2007)
(constitutional claim or question of law may arise from fact-finding when there has
been an error of law or where a discretionary decision is argued to be an abuse of
discretion because it was made without rational justification or based on erroneous
legal standard).
66 E.g., Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction over
discretionary cancellation case because judge's mischaracterization of the evidence
was so serious that it rose to the level of an error of law). See also De Rodriguez v.
Holder, 585 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding numerous meta-rule violations and
reversed the BIA's decision that her marriage had not been bona fide).
67 E.g., Banat v. Holder, 557 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2009) (right to fundamentally
fair hearing violated when agency inappropriately relied on a Department of State
letter); Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (right to fair hearing
violated because government refused to reveal author of adverse forensic report);
De Oliveira v. Holder, 564 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2009) (failure of asylum applicant to
receive statutory right to a fair hearing before a neutral adjudicator).
68 Another possible example of a meta-rule is that adjudicators must not abuse
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constitutional due process violations when adjudicators have violated
some of these rules of fair decision-making.69
A key characteristic of a meta-rule formulation of a mixed
question is that the determination under review by an appellate court
need not be a legal issue but could be a historical fact such as
70whether an event occurred or not. It could, for example, be a
credibility determination. As discussed in Part VI, it could be a
discretionary determination. While the questions of whether an
event occurred or whether a witness is telling the truth are
straightforwardly factual questions, the question of whether a meta-
rule was violated in the course of deciding these factual issues is a
their discretion when making discretionary determinations. As discussed below in
Part VI, courts routinely characterize abuse of discretion claims as factual rather
than legal, however. Abuse of discretion claims are most successful when the
abuse stems from the decision-maker's failure to follow another meta-rule, such as
one of the rules listed above. A further complication of claims involving the abuse
of discretion is that it is not only a rule of decision-making but a standard of
review. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502
U.S. 314, 323 (1992)). In this way, abuse of discretion claims differ from other
types of meta-rule claims, which are typically reviewed de novo.
69 E.g., Chen v. Mukasey, 293 Fed. Appx. 785 (2d Cir. 2008) (considering due
process claims where petitioner alleged that immigration judge had wrongfully
failed to accept evidence and had allegedly displayed bias); Khouzam v. Att'y
Gen., 549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. Pa. 2008) (violation of due process clause where
government terminated deferral of removal because not provided opportunity to
challenge government's assertions that he would not be tortured); Pangilinan v.
Holder, 568 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2009) (immigration judge failed to be thorough in
treatment of pro se litigant's case); Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d at 1067 (due
process violation in adjudication of timeliness of asylum application); Martinez-
Farias v. Holder, 338 Fed. Appx. 729 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding due process violation
because hearing was fundamentally unfair); Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283
(10th Cir. 2009) (failure of immigration judge to rely on evidence as opposed to
own view of what would identify the asylum applicant as a gay person). Courts
have also recognized that the failure to consider evidence violates constitutional
due process. See Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
jurisdiction over due process argument that agency ignored probative evidence).
But see Bazua-Cota v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
characterization as a due process claim where applicant claimed improper
weighing of the equities and hardship); Mehilli v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 86, 94 (1st
Cir. 2005) (improper weighing of evidence and failure to consider evidence not a
constitutional claim).
70 See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a discussion of historical
facts.
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mixed question. Thus, reviewable mixed questions are often
embedded in what initially appear as unreviewable factual questions.
If fact-finding involves the violation of a meta-rule, the
reviewing court must treat it as a mixed question rather than as a
factual one. Courts that rule otherwise often confuse the difference
between a litigant's request for an appellate court to review how the
agency applied a substantive rule to the facts of a case with a
litigant's request for an appellate court to decide whether the agency
followed the right rules governing decision-making.n While both fit
the mixed question formula, the latter type of request, unlike the first,
enjoys greater acceptance as a legal claim. Given this broad
acceptance, litigants raising mixed questions as legal claims are
typically more successful when they argue meta-rule violations.
Indeed, in jurisdictions where particular mixed questions have been
deemed factual, claims involving meta-rule violations are likely a
litigant's only hope of gaining review.
VI. Mixed Questions and the Exercise ofDiscretion
Perhaps no thornier appellate issue exists in immigration law
than the issue of whether and how to review discretionary decisions.
After 1996, when Congress repealed judicial review over certain
discretionary determinations,c72courts have had to engage in the
difficult work of deciding whether a claim involves the prohibited
review of the exercise of discretion and, if so, whether the claim is
nonetheless reviewable under the REAL ID savings clause as a
question of law.
The Supreme Court recently held that the jurisdictional bar
on discretionary decisions does not extend to discretionary decisions
that are not expressly "specified" in the relevant subchapter of the
INA as "in the discretion of the Attorney General."73 It is also well-
settled that statutory interpretation issues, relating to discretionary
71 E.g., Aguilera v. Holder, No. 08-60834, 2009 WL 4279859, at *1(5th Cir.
Dec. 1, 2009) (was not a reviewable legal question whether Inunigration Judge
applied the right definition of qualifying "child" to the facts of applicant's case).
72 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).
7Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010) (holding that review of
discretionary determinations of motions to reopen falls outside the bar).
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forms of relief from removal, fall outside the jurisdictional bar on
review of discretionary determinations.74 Less clear are questions
involving eligibility for discretionary relief but requiring something
more than statutory interpretation. 75  Analysis of the substantial
disagreement, regarding whether particular questions involve the
exercise of discretion, is outside the scope of this article.76 The
analysis here focuses on determinations that are admittedly
74 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that the statute baring
review of certain discretionary decisions did not apply to the statutory
interpretation issue of whether the repeal of discretionary relief under former INA
212(c) was retroactive).
75 An example would be whether a particular applicant has established that
she or he has been a victim of "extreme cruelty" for the purpose of a discretionary
grant of relief from removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2005). Compare
Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2003) (application of
"extreme cruelty" standard involves nondiscretionary determination) with Perales-
Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 982 (10th Cir. 2005) ("extreme cruelty"
determination is discretionary and not a question of law because "involves more
than simply plugging facts into a formula"); see also Stepanovic v. Filip, 554 F.3d
673, 680 (7th Cir. 2009). For an analysis of judicial review of cancellation
applications of victims of domestic abuse, see Anna Byrne, What is Extreme
Cruelty? Judicial Review of Deportation Cancellation Decisions for Victims of
Domestic Abuse, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1815 (2007). Another example is whether the
"particularly serious crime" is a bar to eligibility for asylum or withholding of
removal is a discretionary determination. Compare Alaka v. Att'y Gen., 456 F.3d
88, 100-02 (3d Cir. 2006) ("particularly serious crime" determination is
nondiscretionary and therefore reviewable); Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150,
154-55 (2d Cir. 2008) with Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001)
("particularly serious crime" determination is unreviewable); Lovan v. Holder, 574
F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2009).
76 Examples of disagreement over whether certain immigration law questions
are discretionary abound. Compare Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 100-02 (1st Cir.
2005) (holding that the "good faith marriage" determination for a hardship waiver
under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (2006) is reviewable); Ibrahimi v. Holder, 566 F.3d
758, 763 (8th Cir. 2009), with Urena-Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 159-61
(3d Cir. 2004) (holding "good faith marriage" is discretionary and unreviewable);
Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2004). Compare ANA Intern., Inc.
v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the decision to revoke a
visa is reviewable because there are non-discretionary standards for the courts to
apply), with Jilin Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 203 -04 (3d
Cir. 2006) (holding that because the statute states that the Attorney General "may"
revoke a visa "at any time" the decision is specified as discretionary in the statute
and falls within 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)) (2005); El-Khader v. Monica, 366
F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2004).
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discretionary and within a jurisdictional bar but alleged to be
nonetheless reviewable as an error of law either because they fit
either the basic or the meta-rule formula for a mixed question.
The above discussion of the meta-rule formula helps us to
understand one way in which a reviewable mixed question can be
embedded in a discretionary determination. Recall that the meta-rule
formula is: Based on the administrative record and decision (the
facts A-B), did the judge violate rule X in making the determination?
As pointed out above, the determination could be a factual
determination. In the asylum example in Part III, a factual
determination would be whether the applicant was beaten by
government agents. It could also be a discretionary determination,
such as whether a noncitizen applicant merits cancellation of
removal.7 Regardless of whether an appellate court is precluded
from reviewing whether the noncitizen merited cancellation as a
matter of discretion, it would not be precluded from reviewing
whether the agency violated a rule governing how that discretionary
cancellation of removal decision was to be made. In the context of
reviewing discretionary determinations like a denial of cancellation
of removal, for example, a reviewing court can consider whether the
agency applied the right legal standard in a hardship determination.7 8
n The discretionary remedy of cancellation of removal exists in the statute in
two formulations: one for permanent residents and one for nonpermanent residents.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)-(b) (2006). Both provisions specify that the Attorney
General "may" cancel the removal of the applicant. Id. The factors that guide
decision making are contained in agency case law. See In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23
I.&N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002); In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I.&N. Dec. 56 (BIA
2001); In re C-V-T-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 7 (BIA 1998).
78 E.g., Sumbundu v. Holder, 2010 WL 1337221 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding
jurisdiction to consider claim that the agency "applied the wrong legal standard in
evaluating" a discretionary good moral character determination in a cancellation
case); Gomez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 370, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction
to review legal claim that "the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by focusing
on the present circumstances of his children rather than on the future hardships that
they would face if he were removed" but no jurisdiction to review claim that the
"BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by failing to adequately consider certain
factors that have been considered relevant in other BIA decisions"); Mendez v.
Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009) (error of law when agency applies wrong
standard in hardship determination); Umoh v. Mukasey, 317 Fed. Appx. 714, 717
(10th Cir. 2008) (jurisdiction to review as a question of law the "contention that
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Similarly, courts that have deemed discretionary the determination of
whether an asylum applicant falls within an exception to the one-year
deadline can nonetheless reverse an agency decision premised on the
wrong effective date of the one-year deadline. 79
More conceptually difficult are discretionary claims that fall
within a jurisdictional bar but that fit the basic (rather than the meta)
formula for a mixed question-in other words, claims involving
review of the application of law to established facts in a discretionary
determination. Classic examples involve discretionary hardship
determinations in adjudications of relief from removal like
cancellation of removal.80 In these cases, the agency must weigh the
evidence to determine whether hardship to applicant and/or a
qualifying family member rises to a certain level. While the statute
contains only abbreviated definitions of the various hardship
standards, agency decisions have elaborated on the factors to be
considered.81
Discretionary hardship determinations fit the basic mixed
question formula when there are no disputes of fact:
the BIA applied the wrong standard in determining the extent of hardship to his
family"). But see Nawaz v. Mukasey, 276 Fed. Appx. 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2008)
(whether or not the agency failed to follow controlling BIA case law governing
hardship determination is "does not constitute a question of law"); Josan v.
Mukasey, 298 Fed. Appx. 374, 375-76 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding no review over
cancellation claim, rejecting applicant's argument that claim raised a question of
law) (citing Delgado-Reynua v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 596, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2006)).
79 See Lumataw v. Holder, 582 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2009) (despite one-year
deadline issue being discretionary, court found agency committed legal error by
failing to realize that the one year deadline did not take effect until 1997, which
was after the applicant filed in 1995 (required by statute)).
80 Discretionary determinations related to cancellation of removal applications
fall within the jurisdictional bar at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(B)(i) (2006), which bars
review of "any judgment regarding the granting of relief' under the cancellation of
removal statute. Most, but not all, courts have held that hardship determinations
are discretionary. See Singh v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the extreme hardship determination in the adjudication of a waiver of the joint
filing requirement on a petition to remove a permanent resident condition to be a
nondiscretionary factual determination).
* See supra note 77 for a listing of the main cases elaborating on how the
agency should decide these cases.
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Do the establishedfacts meet the standard for the requisite
level of hardship?
At least one court has commented on how all discretionary
determinations can be characterized as involving the application of
law to fact.82 Courts nonetheless have overwhelmingly treated as
unreviewable the question of whether a particular set of facts rises to
the required level of hardship.83 For the most part, these courts have
summarily concluded that this issue is unreviewable.84
82 Chen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 331 (2d Cir. 2006) ("every
discretionary determination under the INA can in some sense be said to reflect an
'application' of a statute to the facts presented") (citing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320
F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2003)). The court, however, went on to conclude that the
"exercise of discretion" could not be "convert[ed]" into a question of law. Id.
(citing Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172, 178 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (Cabranes, J.,
concurring).
83 See Kodjo v. Mukasey, 269 Fed. Appx. 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008) ("Whether
an alien has proved the requisite degree of hardship [for cancellation of removal] is
not a constitutional claim or question of law.") (citations omitted); Herrera-Castillo
v. Holder, 573 F.3d 1004, 1010 (10th Cir. 2009) (no jurisdiction over hardship
determination); Orellana-Gutierrez v. Mukasey, 272 Fed. Appx. 59, 60 (2d Cir.
2008) (court lacks jurisdiction to consider discretionary hardship determination
and applicant "clearly does not raise a constitutional question or question of law");
Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2006) ("exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship" determination is not reviewable as question of
law). See also Noble v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2007) (no jurisdiction to
review any claim that an IJ or the BIA erred in weighing factors relevant to the
grant or denial of adjustment of status). Even before Congress imposed an express
bar over discretionary determinations involving cancellation of removal, the
Supreme Court had circumscribed review over hardship determinations in INS v.
Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (finding "extreme hardship" subject to
multiple interpretations such that the "construction and application of this standard
should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply because it may prefer
another interpretation of the statute."). See generally Immigration Policy and the
Rights of the Alien, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1396 (1983) (discussing how post-
Wang decisions asserted review over hardship determinations by ensuring that the
agency consider the evidence cumulatively, consider all of the factors, and give
reasons for its decisions).
84 Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475, 480 (4th Cir. 2006) (conflating
discretionary questions with questions of fact to conclude "[t]o the extent that a
petition asks us to review a discretionary or factual determination, however, we
still lack jurisdiction"); Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2006)
(concluding without explanation that "the instant petition, in challenging the BIA's
discretionary extreme-hardship determination, does not raise any 'constitutional
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Courts that rush to decide that a discretionary claim is
unreviewable typically fail to proceed to the second step in the
analysis to consider whether the REAL ID savings clause reinstates
reviewability because the question is legal. These courts confuse the
discretionary-nondiscretionary distinction with the fact-law
distinction, incorrectly assuming that all discretionary determinations
are factual determinations.8 5  This assumption ignores how a
determination might be discretionary and legal at the same time. The
hardship determination discussed above demonstrates how a question
can involve the discretionary weighing of established facts to
determine whether the relevant legal standard of hardship has been
met.
claims or questions of law"'); Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir.
2006) (holding that one-year deadline claims are unreviewable because they are
discretionary determinations without deciding whether they are legal); De La Vega
v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding REAL ID savings clause to
not apply to discretionary determinations, presumably based on unspoken
assumption that a discretionary determination cannot be a question of law) (citing
Xiao Ji Chen v. USDOJ, 434 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2006)); Onikoyi v. Gonzales, 454
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006) (characterizing claim as discretionary challenge but
failing to consider whether raised question of law); Camara v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 497 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2007); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627,
635 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[F]actual or discretionary determinations continue to fall
outside [our] jurisdiction."). Even the Ninth Circuit has sometimes appeared
confused about the issue of discretion, incorrectly assuming that the inquiry ends
with the finding that an issue is discretionary. See Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d
1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding section 106 of the Real ID Act does not
restore our jurisdiction over discretionary determinations by the agency, but
declining to resolve the question). Of course, not all courts fail to ask the question
about whether a discretionary determination is nonetheless reviewable as a
question of law. See, e.g., Patel v. Holder, 563 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2009)
(holding that motions to reopen fall within discretionary bar and that question
presented did not involve question of law).
85 E.g., Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475, 480 (4th Cir. 2006) (conflating
discretionary questions with questions of fact to conclude "[t]o the extent that a
petition asks us to review a discretionary or factual determination, however, we
still lack jurisdiction"); Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding that one-year deadline claims are unreviewable because they are
discretionary determinations without deciding whether they are legal); De La Vega
v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding REAL ID savings clause to
not apply to discretionary determinations, presumably based on unspoken
assumption that a discretionary determination cannot be a question of law) (citing
Xiao Ji Chen v. USD01, 434 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2006))
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Nothing about the discretionary application of law to fact
converts its nature from legal to factual. Discretionary applications
of law to fact are simply a subset of applications of law to fact
generally. This is not to say that discretionary applications of law
are identical to nondiscretionary applications of law in all respects.
The two differ in significant ways. First, the discretionary
application of law to fact is reviewable under an abuse of discretion
standard rather than a de novo standard. 86  Second, an agency's
discretionary decision may be unreviewable if there is not sufficient
law for an appellate court to apply.87 This unreviewability, however,
does not stem from the question being factual rather than legal. To
the contrary, it stems from the question being a legal, mixed question
that cannot be reviewed because the legal standard at issue has not
been sufficiently elaborated.
Some courts appear to evince an understanding that
discretionary determinations can involve the application of law to
fact. The Ninth Circuit in Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, for example,
found the hardship standard to be "subjective," making it impossible
to "review an JJ's application of such standard to the facts of a case,
be they disputed or otherwise."88  This passage suggests that the
court understood that the question did involve the application of law
to facts, but found the standard too ill-defined to permit it to be a
86 Kucana v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502
U.S. 314, 323 (1992)).
87 In the context of Section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedures Act,
the Supreme Court has drawn the "committed to agency discretion" exception
extremely narrowly, applying it only "in those rare circumstances where the
relevant statute 'is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion."' 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 830 (1985)).
88 Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2009). The court,
however, recognized that it did have jurisdiction over a meta-rule claim, namely
that the agency had misapplied the wrong legal standard. Id. at 979. The court
considered whether it had jurisdiction to consider the application of the hardship
standard to the facts of the case even though the petitioners had conceded that the
court lacked jurisdiction "to reweigh the evidence underlying the [agency's]
conclusion that removal would not cause their children an 'exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship.'" Id.
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reviewable legal question. 89 At no point, however, did the court
satisfactorily explain how the subjectivity of the standard could
transform a legal claim involving the application of law to fact into a
factual claim. 90
Although most courts have found unreviewable the
application of hardship standards to established facts, a minority
view exists. In Mendez v. Holder, the Second Circuit suggested that,
if it had not been not bound by prior precedent, it would have been
"inclined to hold that the question of whether an alien has established
'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship' is a determination that
we have jurisdiction to review, just as we can review decisions
dealing with the other eligibility requirements for cancellation of
removal." 91 Unlike other circuits to decide the matter, the Second
8 The court, however, did not go so far as to say that there was insufficient
law to apply under the standard of the Administrative Procedures Act. The
"committed to agency discretion" standard under Section 701(a)(2) of the
Administrative Procedures Act is narrow. See supra note 87. Others have
expressed a view of the hardship standard as ill-defined. Zhang v. Gonzales, 457
F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (Cabranes, J., concurring) (discussing view that the
BIA has said that the term hardship cannot be defined) (citing In re Cervantes-
Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999)). See also Morales Ventura v.
Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2003) (no algorithm for determining
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship). But see Zhang, 457 F.3d at 180
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (stating that "one can read the hardship determination . .
as applications of contoured statutory language to a particular set of facts.").
90 The court pointed to the subjectivity of the hardship standard to distinguish
its holding from its prior decision in Ramadan v. Gonzales, in which it found the
application of the asylum one-year deadline exceptions to be a question of law. See
Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Mendez-Castro v.
Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980-81 (2009). The court, however, did not generalize a
rule for determining when the application of law to fact could be considered a
factual question. Id.
91 Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 322 (2d Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit
had previously ruled that the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"
determination is not reviewable except where the determination is made without
rational justification or based on an "erroneous legal standard" or is "flawed by an
error of law." Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2008). For
a discussion of how these meta-rule violations permit review, see supra Part V.
The discussion in Mendez is consistent with Judge Calabresi's discussion in his
concurrence in Zhang, in which he argues that the extreme hardship determination
falls within the REAL ID savings clause as a question of law because it involves
the "application[] of contoured statutory language to a particular set of facts."
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Circuit in Mendez v. Holder did not consider it unworkable to review
application of a hardship standard.92
Courts must guard against conflating the discretionary-
nondiscretionary distinction with the fact-law distinction. When
courts conclude that a discretionary bar has been triggered, they
cannot end their inquiry. The critical next question is whether the
issue is one of law reviewable under the REAL ID savings clause. If
a discretionary issue involves the application of law to an established
set of facts, then arguably a reviewing court has jurisdiction. Courts
must engage with difficult question of whether the application of law
to established facts in a truly discretionary determination is a
question of law.
VII. Conclusion
We have seen how virtually any claim that is not asking for
review of a historical fact is a claim that fits either the basic or meta-
rule formula of a mixed question involving the application of law to
established facts-a question that the U.S. Supreme Court and many
U.S. courts of appeals have characterized as a legal question. This is
not to say that litigants will be successful in every case that arguably
fits the formula, far from it. If anything, the fact that virtually all
disputes fit a version of the formula is surely evidence of the
inadequacy of the law-fact distinction itself.
While the law-fact distinction may not bear up well under
Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172, 179-81 (2d Cir. 2006). Like the court in Mendez,
Judge Calabresi felt bound by the court's prior decision in De La Vega, which held
that a similar hardship determination was unreviewable. De La Vega v. Gonzales,
436 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2006). In Sumbundu v. Holder, the court similarly suggested
that discretionary determination can be reviewable as a question of law if there is a
sufficiently detailed standard to apply. 2010 WL 1337221 (2d Cir. 2010) ("with
moral character decisions under the catchall clause, there may not be an algorithm,
but there remains a standard-good moral character-which the agency must find.").
The court, however, ultimately characterized the petitioner's claim as a claim that
the agency failed to apply the correct standard. In other words, it characterized the
claim as what this article discusses as a meta-rule violation.
92 In this respect, the Second Circuit in Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d
Cir. 2009), disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552
F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2009), discussed supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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close analysis, it nonetheless permeates our law. Courts must begin
to fashion a more conceptually rigorous approach. Litigators must
understand and employ the wide range of arguments available to
them to secure judicial review.
The above discussion demonstrates the widespread confusion
on how to treat claims that fit the formula of the application of a
legal standard to an established fact. While there is considerable
agreement that mixed questions involving alleged meta-rule
violations are legal claims, there is considerable confusion about
mixed questions involving the application of legal standards to
established facts, especially when courts perceive the standard to be
ill-defined. While arguably all mixed questions are legal questions,
it is unrealistic and naive for litigants to expect success given the
state of the law and the legitimate concern of reviewing courts that it
is difficult to weigh evidence under a standard involving many
factors.
Despite these difficulties, the starting point of any analysis
must be the basic formula of a mixed question and the notion that the
application of law to fact is a legal question. It is incumbent on
courts that deviate from these basic propositions to clearly
acknowledge their departure and to explain why. To do any less is
not only intellectually dishonest, but deepens the already existing
incoherence in our case law. As for litigants, some battles regarding
questions that fit the basic formula are already lost at certain U.S.
courts of appeals, but many remain. Even in substantive areas in
which a court of appeals has categorically characterized a type of
mixed claim as factual and unreviewable, litigants can still argue that
the agency has violated applicable meta-rules-the rules of decision
making-in a particular case. Litigants can and must analyze their
cases to unearth any and all legal errors committed in the course of
agency decision making. By proceeding from analyses framed by
the basic and meta-rule formulas for mixed questions, litigants can
seek to maximize reviewability in a world of limited review and
federal courts can abide by their constitutional Article III mandate.
